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The papers presented in this issue of the Archaeological Review from 
Cambridge (ARC) represent a stimulating set of encounters with 
posthumanism, and demonstrate the increasing breadth of topics that 
archaeologists are thinking about with these new theoretical ideas. 
Here we see everything from ethnographic encounters with people 
and stones, via ash mounds in India, becoming-with animals in the 
Mesolithic, and circumpolar crafting practices to Egyptian gods being 
thought about in new and interesting ways. This speaks both to the 
range of posthumanisms that are available to us as archaeologists, 
and to how these forms of thinking offer us new tools with which 
to engage with our materials. In the short space I have for my 
commentary here I cannot possibly do justice to the different papers, 
and it would do them a deep disservice simply to try and summarize 
them. Instead, therefore, what I want to do is to draw out a single 
theme that I think is critical both to posthumanism—especially the 
elements of it that I find most appealing—and the papers in this issue. 
That theme is difference. 
In their introduction our editors do an excellent job of introducing 
posthumanism, and so I will not rehash that history here. Instead, 
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let me focus on this issue of difference, a word that crops up only a 
handful of times in their opening remarks. For many posthumanists, 
especially those influenced by Rosi Braidotti (e.g. 2011, 2013, 2019) 
and her readings and reinterpretation of Gilles Deleuze (e.g. 2004) 
and Baruch Spinonza (1996; c.f. Deleuze 1988, 1990), difference 
is the critical issue. It fundamentally underlies the approach these 
thinkers take to the world. In our standard understandings of 
difference, the term refers to the presence or absence of similarity, to 
the ways in which two things differ when they are compared. This is a 
fundamentally negative form of difference, in which it is subordinated 
to a broader notion of bounded identity (Deleuze 2004). In contrast, 
for Braidotti (2010: 22) as for Deleuze (2004: 63–64), it is essential 
that we develop a positive or affirmative notion of difference. Here the 
term connotes the processes of differentiation that produce reality—
the ways in which intensive differences form flows of force which 
shape the possibilities of the world around you. This is difference as 
process, difference as energy, difference-in-itself. Difference here is 
not secondary, it is the primary driving element of the world. This 
is critical because it shifts our attention away from ideal types, or 
‘kinds thinking’ as Anna Tsing (2015) would call it, towards analyses 
that focus on process, and how different things emerge through these 
processes. The move away from ideal types, of course, immediately 
undermines the notion of the ahistorical or transcendent human, and 
demands we focus on how people only come to exist within immanent 
relational assemblages. Thus, the ideal subject of humanism is 
revealed to be the ethnocentric imposition of a very particular kind of 
person, and one in need of radical rethinking. This is posthumanism.
How does this issue of difference raise its head in the papers 
contained in this volume of the ARC? For Alicia Núñez-Garcia, 
there is a concern that certain forms of posthumanism, most notably 
second-wave symmetrical archaeology (cf. Harris and Cipolla 2017), 
risk leaving human beings as undifferentiated throughout time and 
space. The absence of difference is key for Núñez-Garcia. For the 
Object Orientated Ontology that underlies second wave symmetrical 
archaeology, objects have essences because they are always in part 
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withdrawn from their relations (e.g. Harman 2011). This means that 
objects can be thought about in the absence of humans. For other 
forms of posthumanism, where relations take centre stage, this is not 
the case. Here relations are not secondary to things themselves, but 
rather emerge in parallel with them. This is a process of difference 
making in which humans and things coalesce together. From this 
perspective there can be no discussion of how things are different 
without also articulating how people, landscapes and materials are 
different too. The question we are forced to pose as posthumanists, 
then, when thinking through the kinds of crafting practices Núñez-
Garcia details, is what can a body, whether human or otherwise, do? 
This question is empirical, historical and post-anthropocentric. It is 
the fundamental question that Spinoza, Deleuze and Braidotti ask, 
and it underlies all posthumanist thought. 
The question of what a body can do brings us to another critical form 
of difference that K. Paddayya raises in his paper on the ash mounds 
of the Deccan, that between the virtual and the actual (Deleuze 2004; 
Harris 2017, 2018, 2019; Lucas 2012). For Deleuze (2004: 260), the 
virtual is the potential present in any set of relations, the fully real 
but not yet actualized elements—the potential for the empty cup in 
your hand to be filled with water, for the empty seat next to you on 
the plane to be sat in. One cannot understand the actual without 
including the virtual—you cannot understand what a cup is unless 
you think about it being filled, or the approach of a stranger towards 
an empty airline seat without the mixture of hope and fear that the 
thought of having a whole row of seats to yourself on a transatlantic 
flight brings. Furthermore, the virtual becomes actual through a 
process of difference making (Deleuze 2004: 258), through the way 
difference emerges in the world—the difference made by someone 
sitting in a seat, or by the filling of your cup. Paddayya uses the virtual 
and the actual to think about how new relations between humans, 
cows and dung differentiate new capacities for these materials, how 
humans can draw on the vibrancy of dung to produce ash, and with 
that ash to actualize and differentiate new potentials for cleansing 
spaces from germs or building new mounds. Humans, animals and 
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materials are here each differentiated through these processes, and 
with them specific historical worlds come into being as new forms of 
material bodies emerge—bodies which can do new things. 
Humans and animals are also involved together in making 
difference in Tove Hjørungdal’s article on the Early Mesolithic of 
southern Scandinavia. In this fascinating paper, Hjørungdal not 
only explores how humans and animals became with one another 
(following Haraway’s (2008) term) in this period, but also how they 
differentiated each other and the landscape around them. Beavers 
and humans form a perfect pair here, building and dwelling across 
landscapes, opening up new spaces with which they each interact in 
distinct ways. The world itself emerges through the complexity of 
relations between beavers, humans, woods and water. The making 
of lodges differentiates a space for beavers to use, but also one that 
humans can employ by supplying materials for them to work with 
and places for them to stay. The lodges are places that make the world 
different through creating virtual capacities that humans and beavers 
can each actualize differently. Difference itself moves and shifts here, 
it is nomadic, as Braidotti (2011) would put it. This complex interplay 
of landscape, people (of potentially different kinds) and animals that 
Hjørungdal begins to map builds on a recent and much welcome turn 
to relations in Mesolithic archaeology (e.g. Conneller 2004; Overton 
and Hamilakis 2013).
Yet the kinds of Deleuzian difference that Braidotti employs, and 
that I have outlined here, are not the only form of difference that 
archaeologists and anthropologists are in the process of developing. 
In his paper, Uroš Matić examines how our understandings of Ancient 
Egypt change when we begin to take the claims made about the divinity 
of Pharaohs seriously, i.e. when we do not presume that pharaohs 
are like gods, but actually are gods. A clear difference emerges here 
between how such claims are normally evaluated—that it must be 
symbolic, metaphorical or representational—and what happens when 
we take them at face value (Holbraad 2007). Matić thus advocates 
for ontological difference, that is not just a generic difference, but 
one that requires us to question our own ontological categories (e.g. 
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the division between the human and the divine) in order to begin 
to translate Egyptian concepts. In the previous examples we have 
seen how posthumanism reaches towards difference as ontology, 
here we see an emphasis on ontological difference (Alberti 2016). 
The two approaches share some things in common (as Viveiros de 
Castro’s (2010) acknowledged debt to Deleuze makes clear), but they 
also differ in important ways (Harris and Crellin 2018; Alberti 2016). 
Nonetheless, the centrality of difference to posthumanism remains 
paramount.
In Hilary Morgan Leathem’s excellent paper we see both versions 
of difference coming together. On the one hand we have the ruins of 
Mitla, which can speak to and possess people—a classic example of 
ontological difference. On the other, Leathem traces why and how 
this form of difference has emerged now—why it is that the ruins 
have become differentiated in a new way, and how new capacities for 
action (the ability to possess someone) have come into being. In effect, 
how have new virtual potentials emerged? In turn, she convincingly 
situates this case within a broader discussion of the ways in which 
colonialism, post-colonialism and state power can never be separated 
from such emerging assemblages—it is the increasing control of the 
ruins by Mexico’s National Institute of Anthropology and History 
that severs one set of relations, whilst also creating new ones. The 
end of one process of becoming means the differentiation of another. 
Leathem’s insightful paper thus offers a route to bring together these 
two forms of difference, tracing how one emerges and allows for the 
other. The close relationship I detect here between a new materialist 
form of difference and an ontological one means I take a different view 
than Leathem on the potential for new materialism in archaeology. 
For me, at least, there is no part of new materialism that aims to 
‘embrace things before all else’ as she puts it—rather the aim of new 
materialism, and posthumanism more generally, would deny that 
things can possibly emerge prior to human beings, or, indeed, vice 
versa. The decentring of the human called for by posthumanism is 
not then aimed at silencing human voices, but instead is intended to 
create the space for different voices, both human and non-human, to 
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emerge outwith the straitjacket demanded by our traditional modes 
of thought. 
Archaeology is still in the early stages of its interaction with 
posthuman concepts. From the various forms of Object Orientated 
Ontology, and the broader school of speculative realism, via new 
materialism, assemblage theory, the affective turn, multispecies 
ethnography, ahumanism, transhumanism, the ontological turn and 
more, there are a multiplicity of avenues for us to explore. Not all of 
these will prove productive for archaeology. Some will allow us to 
say new and interesting things about the past, some will provide new 
modes of critique, others still will open up new subjects of enquiry 
and new questions that lead in directions we cannot currently foresee. 
In their interaction with archaeology they will all need to be altered, 
adjusted, remade and transformed. This is as it should be—concepts 
need to constantly shift to both stay alive and remain useful. The 
papers in this edition of the ARC further our understanding of the 
potentials and pitfalls of some of these different perspectives, and 
suggest ways in which both the original concepts and archaeology 
itself might be transformed through their encounter.
Why should archaeology engage with posthumanism? I suggest that 
our need to adopt a posthuman position in archaeology is driven both 
by the philosophical power of its arguments, the potential it entails 
for changing how we write about the past, and the ethical implications 
it has for the present. In contrast to claims that posthumanism might 
dull the ethical or political critiques we develop, I suggest instead 
that it enhances them. First, it makes space for a much broader 
definition of the human than that with which we have traditionally 
worked. Second, it emphasizes the importance of political ecology, 
and critically that there is no longer any point in drawing a boundary 
between politics and ecology (cf. Carter and Harris forthcoming). 
Our emphasis to date on the human alone has had devastating 
consequences for the world we live in through its bifurcations of 
nature and culture, world and people. By creating posthuman pasts, 
we can help to rethink a posthuman present, and through that to 
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imagine and form the posthuman future. And that, I suggest, is the 
only hope for any kind of future for our species at all. 
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